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Abstract 
 
This study has its starting point in the fact that not all developing countries are equally 
successful in attracting foreign direct investments (FDI). Consequently, this study 
examines the determinants of FDI in a developing country. In previous research, there 
has been a recent shift of focus to the institutional environment of the host countries as a 
determinant of FDI. In line with this development, this study further examines property 
rights as a determinant of FDI. To meet this objective, both a qualitative and a 
quantitative study is conducted. The result of the qualitative study provides evidence of 
the importance of market size, natural resources, human capital, infrastructure, 
investment climate, and property rights as determinants of FDI in the cut flower 
industry in Kenya. Based on interviews with investors and stakeholders, the result 
highlights the importance of property rights protection to land, and identifies both 
market and non-market transaction costs in FDI. In order to draw general conclusions 
on the determinants of FDI in a developing country, the qualitative result is put in 
relation to the result of the quantitative study. The quantitative study is performed 
through a regression analysis of 55 developing countries over the time period 1980-
2010. The quantitative result confirms the positive effect of property rights protection, 
market size, human capital, and openness to trade on FDI. The consistency of the 
qualitative result of the Kenyan cut flower industry, and the quantitative regression 
result of FDI across industries, developing countries and over time, provide overall the 
results of this study with robustness. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades there has been an increase in economic policies in developing 
countries focusing on attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) (Mathur & Singh 
2011, Biglaiser & Staats 2010). The list of potential advantages of attracting FDI can be 
made long. For instance, FDI contributes to the creation of economic growth, by 
providing a stable way for developing countries to increase capital flows and capital 
formation. FDI also functions as a vehicle for technological progress, and a way to 
increase national competitiveness and trade in a global economy (UNCTAD 2004, 
Tejinder & Newhouse 1995, Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007).  
In spite of this development, the results in attracting FDI differ among developing 
countries. An important related question to this development is: which are the key 
determinants of FDI in a developing country? The macroeconomic determinants of FDI 
in developing countries have been analysed to a considerable extent by previous 
research, and a multiple of different determinants are found to affect FDI. Some 
common ground is identifiable in terms of the effect of some of the most fundamental 
determinants, such as the positive impact of the host country market size, human 
capital, and macroeconomic stability (see e.g. Mathur & Singh 2011, Biglaiser & Straat 
2010, Gwenhamo 2011, Resnick 2001, Morisset 2001). 
There has been a recent shift of focus to the role of the host country’s institutional 
environment as a determinant of FDI, e.g. through studies of the effect of the host 
country’s property rights protection on FDI (see e.g. Gwenhamo 2011, Resnick & Li 
2003, Biglaiser & Straat 2010, Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007). Most of the previous 
research of property rights as a determinant of FDI is based on institutional theory (see 
e.g. Gwenhamo 2011, Biglaiser & Straat 2010, Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007). Institutional 
theory suggests that well-defined property rights increase FDI by reducing transaction 
costs and risks in economic exchanges (Gwenhamo 2011). Hence, according to 
institutional theory, foreign investors value host countries that guarantee property rights 
(Mathur & Signh 2011). Thus, this study aims to examine: what importance do property 
rights have as determinant of FDI in a developing country?  
To meet this objective, both a qualitative and quantitative study is conducted. For the 
qualitative study, the Kenyan cut flower industry presents an interesting case for 
examining property rights as a determinant of FDI in a developing country. The 
production of flowers requires access to land that is suitable for growing. In an industry 
where land is a key factor of production it is essential that property rights to land are 
clearly identified over the time period required for the investment. Hence, property 
rights specify the level of access, the legitimate usage, and the right to claim benefits or 
an income stream from the land (World Bank 2003:22, 25-27).  
During the recent decade, the Kenyan cut flower industry has grown rapidly. During the 
same period of time, the Kenyan government has implemented various policy strategies 
to promote private sector investment and FDI (UNCTAD 2012). However, Kenya is 
still ranked as an underperformer in world-wide rankings of host countries by their 
performance and potential in attracting FDI (Njoroge & Okech 2011, UNCTAD 2007). 
Thus, the question arises: what determines the inflow of FDI to the cut flower industry 
in Kenya? What importance do property rights have as a determinant of FDI in the 
Kenyan cut flower industry? 
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For the quantitative study, the aim is to examine the determinants of FDI in low to 
middle-low income developing countries. This is done by performing a regression 
analysis on a sample of 55 developing countries over the time period 1980-2010. The 
results contribute to the existing literature on the determinants of FDI in developing 
countries by examining the presence of reversed causality between FDI and property 
rights. In addition, following the reasoning of Biglaiser & Straat (2010), the quantitative 
results also provide a benchmark for testing the validity and universality of the results 
of the qualitative study. Consequently, the regression analysis provides the opportunity 
to generalise the results.  
Most previous researchers use large data sets to arrive at their conclusions on the 
determinants of FDI. Therefore, they are unable to go deeply into the determinants of 
FDI. Missing from these studies is the expertise from the actual decision makers, i.e. the 
foreign investors themselves. In line with the reasoning of Biglaiser & Straat (2010), 
this study aims to address this missing feature by querying investors and stakeholders 
which factors they consider as important determinants of FDI. The method of the 
qualitative study consists of semi-structured, in person, interviews with both investors 
and stakeholders. The advantage of this method is that it allows for open ended 
questions, based on an interview guide, where the respondents may elaborate freely in 
their answers (Bernard 2006:210, 212). The analyses of the results of both the 
qualitative and quantitative study are based on previous research and institutional 
theory. 
This study provides evidence of the importance of market size, human capital, 
infrastructure, and investment climate as determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower 
industry. Based on interviews with investors and stakeholders, the result highlights the 
importance of property rights protection to land, and identifies both market and non-
market transaction costs in FDI. The regression result of the quantitative study confirms 
the positive effect of property rights protection, market size, human capital, and 
openness to trade on FDI. The consistency of the qualitative result found for the Kenyan 
cut flower industry, and the quantitative regression result for FDI across industries, 
developing countries and over time, provide the overall results of this study with 
robustness.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Part I provides a theoretical framework 
underlying the rest of the study. Part II consists of a qualitative study on the 
determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry. Part III contains a quantitative 
regression analysis on the determinants of FDI in 55 developing countries. The study is 
concluded with a discussion of the main findings. 
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Part I: Theoretical Framework 
This section provides a definition of FDI, a summary of the main motives and 
determinants of FDI as considered in previous research, and the institutional theoretical 
framework. The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical basis underlying the 
rest of the study. 
2. Foreign Direct Investments 
 Definition 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as a cross-border investment, involving a 
long-term relationship and lasting interest of an investor in another economy (OECD 
2013, UNCTAD 2014a). It consists of private or state owned capital flows, which 
provide the investor, or parent enterprise, with at least 10% control over an enterprise 
outside the home country (Biglaiser & Straat 2010, UNCTAD 2014a). Kenyan law 
states that a foreign investor is a natural person, partnership, company or other corporate 
body which is not, or is not owned by, a citizen of Kenya. The term investment refers to 
the contribution of local or foreign capital by an investor, which includes the creation, 
purchase of business assets, or expansion, restructuring, and improvement of a business 
enterprise (IPA 2004). 
Motivations of FDI 
Apart from the importance of property rights, previous research considers a number of 
additional factors as important determinants of FDI. These are summarised in Table 1. 
The first column of the table shows a categorization of the main motivations of FDI. 
These categories are based on the findings of UNCTAD (1998), where the key 
determinants of FDI are divided into three broad categories: FDI policy, business 
facilitation and economic determinants. The economic determinants are in turn divided 
into four sub-categories. These are: market-, resource-, efficiency-seeking and 
competitiveness-enhancing motivations of FDI. In addition to the categories considered 
in UNCTAD (1998), a category reflecting the institutional environment is included. 
This category reflects the institutional features considered as important determinants of 
FDI by recent research. 
The second column shows the institutional and policy related determinants considered 
important by previous research. In the category FDI policy, the factors listed are 
economic and political stability, and openness to trade. The fifth column lists previous 
research that considers each category of determinants as important. The third and fourth 
column summarise the key economic determinants considered by previous research.  
The third column lists the economic determinants traditionally considered by previous 
research. These are market size, human capital, physical infrastructure, capital, and 
input cost and productivity. According to reasoning in UNCTAD (1998), the recent 
globalisation of the world economy has given rise to changes in the relative importance 
of some traditionally considered determinants. For instance, the relative importance of 
the domestic market size for market-seeking FDI is believed to have shifted. In a global 
world economy, market-seeking FDI is believed to mainly be motivated by the access to 
international markets, rather than to primarily serve the domestic market of the host 
country (UNCTAD 1998). 
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Table 1      
Determinant 
  
Category 
Institutions/ 
Policy 
Economic 
 
Traditional 
 
 
Globalised 
 
 
Previous research  
FDI Policyⁱ Stability 
- Economic 
- Politic 
  Gwenhamo (2011), Asiedu 
(2006), Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 
(2011), Resnick (2001), Biglaiser 
& Straat (2010) 
 Openness to 
trade 
  Resnick (2001), Mathur & Sign 
(2011), Morisset (2001), 
Gwenhamo (2011), Biglaiser & 
Straat (2010), Tejinder & 
Newhouse (1995), Mottaleba & 
Kalirajanb (2011) 
Business 
facilitationⁱ 
Promotion & 
incentives 
- Low tax 
  Mathur & Singh (2011) 
Institutional 
environment 
Property 
rights 
  Bénassy-Quéré et al (2007), 
Tejinder & Newhouse (1995), 
Asiedu (2006), Knutsen et al 
(2011) 
 Corruption   Bénassy-Quéré et al (2007), 
Asiedu (2006), Knutsen et al 
(2011), Resnick & Li (2003) 
 Democracy   Resnick (2001), Resnick & Li 
(2003), Jensen (2003) 
Economic: 
Market-seekingⁱ 
  
Market size 
- GDP level 
- GDP growth 
 
Market size 
 
 
- International 
markets 
Bénassy-Quéré et al (2007), 
Biglaiser & Straat (2010), 
Gwenhamo (2011), Resnick 
(2001), Ali et al (2001), Mottaleba 
& Kalirajanb (2011), Knutsen et al 
(2011),  
Resource-
seekingⁱ 
 Human capital 
- Cheap and 
unskilled 
- Size of labour 
force 
 
Natural 
resources 
- Total stocks 
- Fuel, minerals 
-Energy production 
 
Physical 
infrastructure 
- Phone lines 
- Internet users 
 
Capital 
- Intensity 
- Flows 
Human 
capital 
- Skilled and 
reliable supply 
- Literacy rate 
- Secondary 
education 
- Value added 
- Tertiary 
enrolment 
Resnick & Li (2003), Asiedu 
(2006), Morisset (2001) 
Gwenhamo (2011), Mottaleba & 
Kalirajanb (2011) 
 
Biglaiser & Straat (2010), Asiedu 
(2006), Mathur & Singh (2011), 
Resnick & Li (2003), Knutsen et al 
(2011), Morisset (2001) 
 
Mathur & Singh (2011), Morisset 
(2001), Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 
(2011) 
 
Gwenhamo (2011), Biglaiser & 
Straat (2006),  Tejinder & 
Newhouse (1995) 
Efficiency-
seekingⁱ 
 Input cost and 
productivity 
 
 
FDI policy 
- Business 
facilitation 
- Investment 
policy 
Tejinder & Newhouse (1995), 
Mottaleba & Kalirajanb (2011), 
Asiedu (2006),  Bénassy-Quéré et 
al (2007) 
Competitiveness-
enhancingⁱ 
  Created 
assets 
-Agglomeration 
economies 
- Broad range of 
resources 
- Infrastructure 
facilities 
 
  * 
ⁱ Categories based on UNCTAD (1998) 
* Not commonly considered in previous research 
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The fourth column explains how these traditionally considered determinants are altered 
by increased competitive pressure in a globalised world economy. The determinants 
added to the traditional ones are skilled labour force, FDI policy and created assets. 
Created assets are assets generated by the host country with the aim of providing the 
investors with a competitive edge. One such example is infrastructure facilities, i.e. the 
provision of a reliable transport system. Additional created asset are agglomeration 
economies and the availability of a broad range of resources. Agglomeration economies 
are spatial clusters of related activates and specialized services. The clusters are often 
focused towards upgrading the competitive advantage of the participating investors 
(UNCTAD 1998). 
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3. Institutional Theory: Why Do Property Rights Matter for FDI? 
In previous research the importance of property rights for FDI is often based on 
institutional theory (see e.g. Gwenhamo 2011, Biglaiser & Straat 2010, Bénassy-Quéré 
et al 2007). The theory states that well-defined property rights positively affect FDI, by 
reducing the transaction costs and risks in economic exchanges. Hence, property rights 
influence the allocation and utilization of resources (Gwenhamo 2011, Musole 2009).  
Institutions are defined as humanly created constraints which govern social interaction 
(North 1991, Resnick & Li 2003). Furthermore, institutions are divided into levels of 
constraints, either formal (i.e. laws and constitutions) or informal (i.e. behavioural 
norms, conventions and codes of conduct), and enforcement characteristics which 
legitimise and maintain the formal constraints (North 1990:4, North 1991). Institutions 
affect the set of allowed actions, and the relative prices of choosing one action over the 
other. In this sense, institutions create structures of incentives that influence the 
behaviour of economic agents (Justesen & Kurrild-Klitgaard 2013, Tejinder & 
Newhouse 1995). 
As an institution, property rights consist of social agreements, which are backed up by 
both informal and formal norms. Hence, property rights rely on both the consensus 
between people on how a certain resource is held, used and transferred, and on the 
administration and enforcement provided by the government (World Bank 2003:22-24, 
Resnick & Li 2003). Property rights and the way in which they are designed, together 
with efficient enforcement mechanisms, contribute to defining the incentive structures 
that influence the behaviour of economic agents (Justesen & Kurrild-Klitgaard 2013, 
Tejinder & Newhouse 1995).  
Property rights specify the access to and legitimate uses of a resource. Access is 
determined through the duration of the rights, which span from perpetual, full 
ownership, to temporary user rights. The level of access affects the investment, since the 
duration of the rights need to match the investment. Property rights also allow 
individuals and firms to claim benefits or an income stream from that resource, and thus 
define costs and rewards of decisions made with regard to the use of the resource 
(Libecap 1986, Musole 2009).  
In the literature, property rights are often defined as the right of individuals to govern 
their own labour supply and the goods and services they own (see e.g. North 1990:33, 
Justesen & Kurrild-Klitgaard 2013, Musole 2009). For the investor, property rights may 
be interpreted as the possibilities by which the investor can protect its resources and 
ideas (Gooroochurn & Hanley 2007). Property rights may also be interpreted in terms of 
exclusive rights over an asset, or the attributes of an asset (Milonakis & 
Meramveliotakis 2012).  
Property rights are said to be secure when the government recognizes ownership 
through legal titles, and the ownership is protected from threats such as theft or 
intrusion. In addition, contracts are considered to be legally binding, and are enforceable 
by an independent court. On the opposite end, property rights are said to be insecure, or 
ill-defined, if they are violated e.g. through expropriation, breach of contracts or an 
inefficient rule of law (Biglaiser & Straat 2010, Resnick & Li 2003). In this sense, well-
defined property rights reduce the risk of not getting the required return of the 
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investment, since the threats facing the investor, through violations of property rights, 
are reduced (Resnick & Li 2003, Knutsen et al 2011, Musole 2009).     
Efficient protection of property rights enable the investor to plan ahead, provide 
incentives to invest and facilitate economic transactions, by reducing transaction costs 
(Justesen & Kurrild-Klitgaard 2013). Transaction costs arise in the process of an 
economic exchange, and their magnitude affect the way economic activity is organised 
and carried out. Specifically, transaction costs are defined as the costs of measuring the 
valuable attributes of the resource that is being exchanged, as well as the costs of 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements and contracts (North 1990:61-62, 
Tejinder & Newhouse 1995).  
The transaction costs may be categorised as market and non-market transaction costs. 
The market transaction costs arise on the market, and are e.g. legal fees and title 
insurance. The non-market transaction costs are e.g. the cost of the time that each party 
must devote to gathering the information necessary for an economic exchange, and the 
costs of undertaking economic activity in compliance with rules and regulations. The 
cost of time of gathering information is high if the information is not efficiently 
distributed, i.e. it is asymmetrically held by the parties of the exchange (North 1990:61-
62, Musole 2009). Therefore, the transaction costs are related to the business climate 
and interaction between individuals. In summary, transaction costs are the costs 
necessary to enable production and exchange of goods, resources and services (Tejinder 
& Newhouse 1995).  
If the transaction costs are too high, the theory states that no economic exchange occurs 
at all (North 1990:66). As a result, a country that has in place property rights institutions 
and a business culture that reduce transaction costs should thus have a competitive 
advantage in attracting FDI (Tejinder & Newhouse 1995). 
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Graph 1 
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Part II: A Qualitative Study of the Determinants of FDI in a 
Developing Country 
Part II consists of a qualitative study of FDI in a developing country. The qualitative 
study is conducted as a field study in Kenya, examining the determinants of FDI in the 
Kenyan cut flower industry. Part II consists of an introduction to Kenya’s economic 
development, an introduction to the cut flower industry, a description of qualitative 
method and presentation and analysis of the results.  
4. Background 
Kenya 
Kenya lies across the equator in East Africa, bordering Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, 
Uganda, and Tanzania. Kenya plays a central role in East Africa, functioning both as a 
regional and an international hub, and by being the largest economy in the region. 
Kenya's population is estimated to be 43.2 million (in 2013) (KPMG 2014a, World 
Bank 2014c).  
Kenya’s real GDP growth rate and level during the period 1963-2013, is shown in 
Graph 1. In 1963 Kenya gained independence, and became a multiparty democracy in 
1992 (KPMG 2014b). During the first decade of independence, Kenya’s economic 
performance was stronger than in most African countries with an average annual GDP 
growth rate of 6% (FRD 2007). However, the economic governance was hampered by 
corruption. Together with chronic budget deficits and inflationary pressure, it 
contributed to the following poor economic performance (KPMG 2014b, OECD 2002).  
From the 1980’s until the early 2000’s, Kenya experienced a period of economic 
stagnation. After 1993 the government began to liberalise the economy. By the mid-
2000’s, the economy had recovered, with an annual growth rate of approximately 5%. 
The economic performance was slowed down by the impact of both a drought and the 
global recession in 2008, but began to recover again in 2009. The GDP growth rate in 
2013 is estimated to be 5.1% (UNCTAD 2012).  
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In terms of FDI, Kenya was a prime choice for foreign investors seeking to establish a 
presence in East Africa during the 1960’s and 1970’s. However, a combination of a 
period of economic stagnation, rising problems with corruption, crime and insecurity, 
and poor infrastructure generated a long period of low FDI inflows from the beginning 
of the 1980’s until the mid-2000’s (UNCTAD 2012, 2008). As shown in Graph 2, from 
2006 to 2007, the net FDI inflows increased more than fourteen-fold. In 2008 the net 
FDI inflows dropped sharply, but began to recover again in recent years. 
Graph 2 
 
 
World Bank (2014e), UNCTAD (2014b) 
 
The Kenyan economy is considered to be relatively diverse. The services sector 
accounts for more than half of nominal GDP, agriculture for more than a quarter, and 
the industrial sector is responsible for the remaining part. Agriculture is a very 
important sector of the economy, both due to its contribution to GDP, and because it 
employs roughly 75% of the country’s labour force, either directly or indirectly (EPZA 
2005, UNCTAD 2012). Out of these 75%, it is estimated that 2 million people are 
employed in the agricultural sub-sector called horticulture. The horticultural sector has 
grown more than 50% over the last 10 years (UNCTAD 2014a, 2012). Horticulture is 
Kenya’s most important export sector, and includes the production of fruits, nuts, 
vegetables and cut flowers (EPZA 2005). In 2011, the cut flowers industry accounted 
for 18% of the horticultural exports (UNCTAD 2012).  
The cut flower industry 
The world cut flower market is dominated by the Netherlands, which accounts for 
approximately 50% of total world exports (Hollandtrade 2013). The next four leading 
global flower exporters, in terms of export value, are Colombia, Ecuador, Kenya, and 
Ethiopia (Rikken 2011, WTEX 2014).  
In 2013, HCDA estimated that 105 430 tons of flowers were exported from Kenya. 
Graph 3 shows the export volume in 2013, in terms of export destination as percentage 
share of total exports. As is shown in Graph 3, Europe is the main importer and 
accounted for more than 80% of Kenya’s cut flower exports in 2013.  
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Producing flowers is a complex 
business. In order to match the 
changing demands of the 
consumers, R&D by flower 
breeders is needed. Apart from 
R&D, starting materials such as 
seeds, young plants and 
cuttings, and other important 
inputs such as pesticides, 
fertilisers, packaging material 
and water access are required 
(Ksoll et al 2009, World Bank 
2006).  
Thus, cut flower production is 
highly specialized, and places 
high requirements on both 
capital and labour intensity. In 
terms of capital, building 
greenhouses and other 
production facilities implies 
significant sunken assets for the 
investors (EPZA 2005). 
The flowers are picked in fields or greenhouses, then immediately transferred to cool 
storage rooms. The temperature is an important factor to preserve the quality of the 
flowers (Ksoll et al 2009, EPZA 2005). Finally, the flowers are flown to overseas 
markets in temperature controlled containers. Most of the flowers reach the sales shelf 
within 24-48 hours after being harvested (Ksoll et al 2009, World Bank 2006). The cut 
flower industry has existed in Kenya since the 1980’s. During the 1990’s it became a 
substantially more important industry, and production shifted towards higher-value 
greenhouse flowers, with roses dominating the production (UNCTAD 2012). The 
industry has grown rapidly during the last decade, and currently accounts for a 
significant part of Kenya’s agricultural exports (WTEX 2014). 
During the recent years, the sector has benefited from new FDI that have brought more 
technology and know-how to the industry (World Bank 2005). FDI in the Kenyan cut 
flower industry mainly stems from the major global competing flower producing 
countries such as the Netherlands and the UK (EPZA 2005). The largest concentration 
of flower growers is found in the areas surrounding Lake Naivasha, but investors are 
present in a number of other areas as well, e.g. the western parts of Kenya, around Rift 
Valley, Mount Kenya, and Nairobi and its international airport (Ksoll et al 2009, KFC 
2014b). 
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5. Qualitative Method 
Data availability 
The collection of data on FDI in Kenya is incomplete, and there is no clear mandate by 
any agency to collect comprehensive data on FDI (KPMG 2014b). The Kenya Flower 
Council (KFC) collects data based on membership, which is voluntary for growers 
(Githiga 13/06/14). In April 2014, the KFC consisted of 74 registered members. The 
KFC estimates that their members are responsible 70% of the flowers exported from 
Kenya (KFC 2014a, 2014c). The Kenyan Investment Authority (KIA) collects data on 
registered investors. However, it is not mandatory for investors to register with KIA, 
and there is no estimate available on the extent to which investors choose to register 
with KIA (Nyamweya 19/05/14).  
The Kenya Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) collects information on a sectorial basis only, 
i.e. the horticultural sector, and not the cut flowers industry separately (Nderitu 
13/06/14). The Horticultural Crop Development Agency (HCDA) collects data on 
export volumes and destination of the exported cut flowers. However, no data is 
available on the number of FDIs currently operating in the cut flower industry in Kenya, 
or their country of origin (Ng’ayu 13/06/14). Previous research estimates the number of 
growers exporting cut flowers to be around 120 (in 2009) (see Ksoll et al 2009). The 
industry is estimated to employ over 50 000 people in Kenya (in 2009) (Finlays 2009), 
which implies an average of 400
1
 employees per farm.     
The sample 
Due to the lack of a comprehensive statistical overview of the industry, the sampling 
frame
2
 is based on the main industry characteristics of the Kenyan cut flower industry. 
These characteristics aim to match and summarise the main findings of previous 
research on the industry (see e.g. EPZA 2005, UNCTAD 2012, Ksoll et al 2009, 
Njoroge & Okech 2011), as presented in chapter four. 
Industry characteristics: 
 
I. FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry mainly stems from countries such as the Netherlands 
and the UK (EPZA 2005) 
II. The number of growers exporting cut flowers was estimated to be around 120 in 2009 (Ksoll 
et al 2009). The industry was estimated to employ over 50 000 people in Kenya in 2009 
(Finlays 2009), which would imply an average of around 400 employees per grower    
III. The cut flower industry has existed in Kenya since the 1980s, and during the 1990s it became 
a substantially more important industry (UNCTAD 2012) 
IV. In 2013 Kenya exported about 105 430 tons of flowers, and Europe was the main importer 
accounting for more than 80% (HCDA 2014a) 
The sample consists of four growers and one breeder. The characteristics of the sampled 
investors are shown in Table 2. The first column corresponds to the first industry 
characteristic, and presents the investors’ country of origin. The second column 
corresponds to the second industry characteristic, and shows the number of employees 
                                                             
1 Based on the number of growers (both foreign and local) estimated by Ksoll et. al (2009). 
2 A sampling frame is defined as a list of units of analysis from which one takes a sample and to which 
one generalises (Bernard 2006:147). For a detailed presentation see e.g. Bernard (2006).  
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of each farm. The aim of the sample is to include the views of both major, medium 
sized and small investors. The third column corresponds to the third investment 
characteristic, and shows how many years the investors have been operating in the 
Kenyan cut flower industry. The aim is to include the views of both the relatively 
experienced and new investors. The fourth and fifth columns together correspond to the 
fourth industry characteristic, and show each investor’s percentage of total export 
volume in 2013 and export destinations. 
 
In addition, four stakeholders are included in the sample. Three of these are government 
bodies, working with industry support and policy formulation. These three are the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), HCDA and KIA. MoA works with facilitation and 
promotion of food and agricultural production (MoA 2014). HCDA is the government’s 
regulatory agency in the horticultural sub-sector (HCDA 2014b). KIA is responsible for 
investment promotion and facilitation (KenInvest 2014a). The fourth stakeholder is 
KFC, an independent organisation working on industry development, with the aim of 
fostering responsible and safe production (KFC 2014d).  
  
Table 2 
 
   
Country of 
origin 
Number of 
employees 
Years in Kenya 
% of total 
Export 
volume 
(2013)ⁱ 
Export 
destinations 
(2013) 
Netherlands 700 
Established partner for 20 
years, became independent 
grower 11 years ago 
2.3% 
Netherlands 
(100%) 
Netherlands 620 13 years 1.4% Netherlands 
(90%) 
Europe (9%) 
Japan (1%) 
United 
Kingdom 
8 000 Established partner for 15 
years, became independent 7 
years ago 
9.5% United 
Kingdom 
(82.5%) 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 60 1 year - * - 
Netherlands 78 5 years - ** - 
* No exports in 2013, ** No export (breeder) 
ⁱ Percentage share of total export volumes of cut flowers in Kenya in 2013, based on the 2013 export  
  volume of each the grower 
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6. Interview Results 
This section presents the main arguments made by the investors and stakeholders during 
the interviews. The main questions outlined in the interview guide, and the 
corresponding discussion points, are presented in Appendix 1. 
6.1. What determines FDI in the cut flower industry in Kenya? 
During the interviews, the sampled investors and stakeholders were asked which factors 
they consider as important determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry. All 
factors mentioned during the interviews are sorted according to five broad categories, as 
shown in Table 3. These five categories are market size, natural resources, human 
capital, infrastructure, and investment climate. The first column of Table 3 lists the 
determinants mentioned by the sampled investors. The second column lists the 
determinants mentioned by the sampled stakeholders.  
Table 3  
Investors Stakeholders 
Natural resources 
- Favourable climate 
- Water availability 
Natural resources 
- Favourable climate 
- Water availability 
- Land availability 
Human capital 
- Skilled labour force 
- Size of labour force 
Human capital 
- Skilled labour force 
- Continuity in availability 
Infrastructure 
Transportation 
- Roads, air 
- Cold chains 
Infrastructure 
Transportation 
- Roads, air, water 
Industry size 
- Supply availability 
- Strategic location in East Africa 
Industry size 
 
- Strategic location in East Africa 
- Market position: one of the top 5 exporting 
countries 
- Technological development 
Market size 
- Hub in the East African region 
- Number of growers and potential 
buyers 
Market size 
- Hub in the East African region 
- Number of growers and potential buyers 
 Investment climate 
- Laws and regulations favourable for investment 
- Regional body signatory (EAC) 
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Market size 
In terms of multinational firms geographically diversifying, and applying their model of 
investment to other parts of the world, investors may want to seize the opportunity to 
get a foothold in potential markets (Mwirigi 14/06/14). Indeed, with regard to the 
Kenyan cut flower industry, it is believed that the domestic market for cut flowers is 
slowly increasing (Masaku 02/05/14). Kenya is also part of the East African 
Community
3
, which implies access to big potential markets for investors to sell their 
products (Nyamweya 19/05/14). 
However, the production of cut flowers in Kenya is mainly export oriented (Ksoll et al 
2009). Yet, the size of domestic and regional market is an important determinant for 
flower breeders. The breeders work with the development of new flower varieties and 
sell plants to the growers, who in turn grow and export the flowers. Kenya has quite a 
large number of flowers growers, and functions as a hub for the wider East African 
market of growers (Beresford 14/05/14).  
Natural resources 
Kenya is located at the equator, and offers favourable climate for growing high quality 
horticultural products. Some of the factors considered important for flower productions 
are a consistent climate, suitable average altitude and temperature, access to water, and 
12 hours of sunlight per day all year. The warm climate also contributes to lowering 
energy costs, since the greenhouses do not need be heated to ensure a temperature 
suitable for growing flowers (Githiga 13/06/14, Zuurbier 14/05/14, Kneppers 16/05/14, 
Ng’ayu 13/06/14, Nyamwwya 19/05/14). 
The availability of land is an important prerequisite for the FDI in the Kenyan cut 
flower industry. However, land in high potential growing areas especially attractive to 
investors, such as around Lake Naivasha, is becoming increasingly scarce (Masaku 
02/05/14, Ng’ayu 13/06/14, Githiga 13/06/14).  
Human capital  
The production of cut flowers is labour intensive, and thus labour availability is an 
important determinant (Zuurbier 14/05/14, Louwerse 16/05/14, Kneppers 16/05/14, 
Masaku 02/05/14, Githiga 13/06/14, Nyamweya 19/05/14, Ng’ayu 13/06/14). The 
Kenyan labour force is considered to have the necessary know-how and technical 
capacity for growing flowers (Ng’ayu 13/06/14, Nyamweya 19/05/14). In addition, 
some of the investors consider it to be easier to find skilled labour in Kenya, compared 
to the neighbouring countries Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania. However, labour costs 
are higher in Kenya, than in the neighbouring countries (Louwerse 16/05/14, Mwirigi 
14/06/14). Nevertheless, the labour costs are much lower than in the investors’ countries 
of origin, and labour is still considered to be affordable in Kenya (Louwerse 16/05/14, 
Zuurbier 14/05/14). 
 
                                                             
3 The East African Community (EAC) is the regional inter-governmental organisation of the Republics of 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda, headquartered 
in Tanzania. For a detail presentation see EAC (2011). 
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Infrastructure 
A well-developed transportation network is considered to be an important determinant 
(Mwirigi 14/06/14, Nyamweya 19/05/14, Kneppers 16/05/14, Githiga 13/06/14). For the 
flowers to remain of good quality, they need to be stored and transported in a cool 
temperature, and reach their destinations fast (Masaku 02/05/14). Twenty years ago, 
neither the quality of the cut flowers nor the infrastructure was considered to be good in 
Kenya. But the infrastructure improved, the transportation time decreased and the cold 
chains improved, which allowed the quality of the flowers to improve as well (Kneppers 
16/05/14). Compared with the neighbouring countries, Kenya is also considered to have 
the advantage of offering the investors an established infrastructure (Mwirigi 14/06/14).  
The internal infrastructure of the cut flower industry in Kenya is considered to be well-
developed. The whole horticultural sector is big in Kenya, which contributes to good 
availability of the supplies necessary for both growing and breeding flowers, such as 
fertilisers, chemicals, irrigation systems and greenhouse spare parts (Louwerse 
16/05/14, Zuurbier 14/05/14).  
Investment climate 
Compared to the neighbouring countries, Kenya is considered to have more know-how 
on investments, and a market that is more open towards investments. These factors are 
believed to be largely driven by the fact that Kenya has been politically and 
economically stable for a longer period of time (Mwirigi 14/06/14, Ng’ayu 13/06/14, 
Nyamweya 19/05/14). In addition, government facilitation, industry involvement and 
support to the industry, are considered by the stakeholders to be important determinants 
of FDI. The government also provides incentives to the investors, such as tax holidays
4
 
and export processing zones
5
 (Nyamweya 19/05/14, Githiga 13/06/14).  
On the other hand, the investment climate is adversely affected by corruption. The 
investors state that it may be hard to set-up and establish a business in Kenya, as a 
consequence of government corruption (Mwirigi 14/06/14). 
  
                                                             
4 Tax holiday refers to a time period when the investor is not obligated to pay tax, e.g. the ten first years 
from the investment. For detailed presentation see KenInvest (2014b).  
5 Export Processing Zones, which are an investment service, allow for certain incentives for investors to 
produce to export. Such incentives are duty and VAT free import of inputs for production of export 
products within specified zones. For detailed presentation see EPZA (2014). 
 
20 
 
6.2. Are property rights an important determinant of FDI in the cut flower 
industry in Kenya? 
The sampled investors and stakeholders were asked if they consider property rights 
protection as an important determinant of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry. Due to 
the importance of access to land in the industry, property rights protection is 
operationalised by discussing the importance of property rights to land. The statements 
and arguments made by the investors and stakeholders are sorted and categorised 
according to two broad categories: land registration and contracts, and land dispute 
settlements.  
In the same vein, transaction costs are operationalised by discussing the access to 
information necessary for the investment, and compliance with government rules and 
regulations. The main arguments brought forward during the interviews are sorted into 
two categories: accessing information and compliance with rules and regulations. 
Land registration and contracts 
In describing why ownership is important, one of the investors explains that ownership 
of property functions as a long run collateral. As one of the investors puts it: “If you own 
the property, you at least have the value of the property, which is a proper backbone 
for your investment” (Kneppers 16/05/14). Most of the investors state that property 
rights protection is important for their investment. In addition, most of the investors 
have so far not experienced any issues with property rights protection of the land of 
their farms (Zuurbier 14/05/14, Mwirigi 14/06/14).  
Kenya is generally considered to be an economically and politically stable country 
(Mwirigi 14/06/14). In terms of policy, it is important for the investors to be confident 
that the terms and condition of their investment do not suddenly change. As an example, 
the Kenyan constitution which came into force in 2010, restated the maximum length of 
land lease terms available to foreigners. The maximum length changed from 999 years 
to 99 years. A lease of 99 years is still considered by the investors to be a long enough 
period of time. But the change also shows how terms and conditions can be altered 
without negotiation with the contract holders. It also highlights the possibility of future 
changes, which induces uncertainty for the investors (Zuurbier 14/05/14). 
In spite of the changed lease terms, it is generally held among the investors that the 
situation in Kenya is favourable to that of the neighbouring East African countries. 
Compared to Ethiopia, Kenya is described by some of the investors as a generally freer 
country. The Kenyan government is considered to be more trustworthy than the 
Ethiopian. Some of the investors state that the Ethiopian government offer the investors 
access to land free of charge. But the land contracts are considered to be uncertain, as 
they might be changed or completely dissolved in the future (Louwerse 16/05/14). 
Consequently, Ethiopia is considered to be an unreliable investment choice. In a 
comparison with the situation in Kenya, one of the investors comments: “If they decide 
you are going to leave the country, then you are leaving the country. Of course, that 
could happen here as well, but the likelihood of that happening is very small” 
(Kneppers 16/05/14). 
A recurrent statement among the stakeholders is that property rights to land is a merit of 
Kenya, since it is one of the most regulated matters in Kenya. Thus, the Kenyan law is 
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considered to be clear on property rights protection (Githiga 13/06/14, Masaku 
02/05/14, Nyamweya 19/05/14, Mwirigi 14/06/14). Once the ownership of the land or 
the contract to lease the land is registered, no one has the legal right to take it away from 
the land contract holder (Mwirigi 14/06/14). The government body responsible for the 
registration of land, contract enforcement and dispute settlement in Kenya is the 
Ministry of Land. The Ministry of Land is the central government body, and the county 
based equivalent is called the Land Board (Nyamweya 19/05/14).  
The main regard of the Land Board is to protect the land contract holders, both local and 
foreign. The registration of land is described to be a legally based process, in which the 
Land Board approves the land registration and administers the documentation (Githiga 
13/06/14). Most of the stakeholders state that once the land registration process is 
approved, the land contract provides the investor with a guarantee, from both the 
government and the law. Therefore, the stakeholders consider that the investors should 
be able to work comfortably with that contract, without having their business disrupted 
(Nyamweya 19/05/14, Githiga 13/06/14). 
However, the presence of government corruption complicates both the process of 
registering the land and the subsequent protection of the contracts. Most of the investors 
are confident with their current land contracts. Yet, the investors say that the only thing 
the investor can do, is to find a reliable party and set up a land contract. Or as one of the 
investors puts it: “We think we did OK. But in 20 years I can tell you if I did” (Louwerse 
16/05/14). On the other hand, some of the investors argue that the corruption of the 
government does not erode the legitimacy of the land contracts. One of the investors 
states that: ”Bribery, short-cuts and illegal transfers of land rights are problems. These 
issues are all related to the corruption of the government, and have nothing to do 
with the legitimacy of land” (Mwirigi 14/06/14).   
Land dispute settlements 
A recurrent statement made by the investors is that there are a lot of land disputes in 
Kenya. The land disputes are described to typically consist of a situation where one 
party is making claims of ownership on a plot of land that is not theirs, or cases with 
two land titles and two different claimants to the land. The history of the land needs to 
be carefully investigated to ensure that there is no dispute over the land. The importance 
of checking the history of the land, and legally registering before the investment, is 
highlighted by most of the investors (Louwerse 16/05/14, Zuurbier 14/05/14, Kneppers 
16/05/14).  
In case of a land dispute, the Land Board aims to resolve the dispute. The stakeholders 
explain that in case of a land dispute, a settlement is found through a legal process 
(Githiga 13/06/14, Nyamweya 19/05/14). Yet, most of the investors describe the 
enforcement mechanisms to be expensive and time consuming. More importantly, once 
the investment is set up on the land, the investor is considered to have very low 
bargaining power. It is stated that the only position the investor has to negotiate from, is 
to withdraw from the investment and take everything off the land (Kneppers 16/05/14, 
Louwerse 16/05/14). 
The issue of land disputes implies additional risk for the investor. Most of the investors 
state that they would not invest on land that is disputed (Kneppers 16/05/14, Louwerse 
16/05/14, Zuurbier 14/05/14). Or, as one of the investors puts it: “If you come across 
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land with disputes, stay away” (Kneppers 16/05/14). Hence, to attract foreign 
investment, it is considered to be favourable to have a situation where land titles are 
easily identifiable (Zuurbier 14/05/14).  
Accessing information  
The government body responsible for investment facilitation and promotion is KIA 
(Githiga 13/06/14, Nyamweya 19/05/14). A representative of KIA describes the work of 
KIA: “Once the investor has decided to come and invest in Kenya, we literally hold 
their hand” (Nyamweya 19/05/14). The aim of KIA’s work is to provide the investors 
with the information necessary for the investment, assist the investors in the challenges 
they might be facing, and thus enable them to operate comfortably in Kenya. KIA’s role 
extends from helping the investors to set up in Kenya, i.e. acquire licenses and permits 
and the necessary registration, to providing aftercare services for established investors, 
e.g. through regularly visits to the investors. But the investors need to seek the 
assistance of KIA themselves, since it is not mandatory for the investors to register with 
KIA (Nyamweya 19/05/14).  
The investors describe the access to information and providence of guidance in a 
different manner. The investors describe a system hampered by corruption, where the 
investor cannot expect to get assistance from the government (Louwerse 16/05/14). One 
of the investors explains: “The government is not going to take you by the hand and 
guide you through the process, you should find out for yourself” (Zuurbier 14/05/14). 
Instead, a recurrent statement among the investors is that previous experience and a 
contract network are important measures to gather the information necessary to the 
investment (Louwerse 16/05/14, Zuurbier 14/05/14, Kneppers 16/05/14).  
Most of the investors state that new investors are in for a challenge if they do not have 
previous experience and an established contact network in the country (Louwerse 
16/05/14, Zuurbier 14/05/14, Kneppers 16/05/14). One of the investors describes: “For 
the new investor, the list of relevant information can be very long” (Louwerse 
16/05/14). Some examples mentioned by the investors are the need to know how to 
deal with the local government, how to get building permits, where to get materials, and 
which contractors to work with (Louwerse 16/05/14).  
In addition, some of the investors highlight the fact that, without access to the 
information necessary, the risk of making losses increases. Nevertheless, most of the 
investors agree that once experience is gained, and the necessary contacts have been 
made, gaining accessing information is simple (Kneppers 16/05/14, Mwirigi 14/06/14). 
Compliance with rules and regulations 
The investors also highlight the importance of previous experience of dealing with 
government officials. The investors state that to avoid corruption, the best strategy is to 
stay professional and make sure of complying with all the rules and regulations set by 
the government (Zuurbier 14/05/14, Louwerse 16/05/14). However, the government’s 
rules and regulations are often described as complex. As one of the investors puts it: 
“There are so many rules and regulations here, and things that can restrict you” 
(Louwerse 16/05/14).  
In the same vein as with the access to information, most of the investors state that new 
investors are in for a challenge, if they do not have previous experience in country. As a 
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consequence, it may be especially difficult for new investors to comply with rules and 
regulations (Zuurbier 14/05/14). The investors may feel pressured to pay bribes, 
especially when the future of the investment is under threat. As one of the investors puts 
it: “In the beginning they try what they can and cannot get from you, and it may be 
difficult to stay professional” (Louwerse 16/05/14).  
However, most of the investors agree that established investors are less exposed to 
corruption. Indeed, it is considered to be less prevalent, and easier to tackle, with more 
experience and an established contact network (Louwerse 16/05/14, Kneppers 
16/05/14).  
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7. Analysis of the Qualitative Results 
7.1. Analysis based previous research 
This section provides an analysis of the results presented in section 6.1. The aim is to 
examine the economic motivations of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry on basis of 
previous research, as summarized in Table 1.  
Market-seeking 
Some of the investors and stakeholders state that the market size is an important 
motivation for the investor to get a foothold in potential and growing markets. On the 
other hand, the Kenyan cut flower industry is mainly export oriented and does not 
primarily aim to serve the domestic market. This indicates that the domestic market size 
is not as important as it is traditionally considered to be for market-seeking FDI. Rather, 
FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry is motivated by the access to and size of 
international markets. This result corresponds to the changed importance of the 
domestic market size, relative to the international market size, shown in the third 
column of Table 1.  
Resource-seeking 
Human capital 
In terms of resources, human capital, infrastructure and natural resources are identified 
as important determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry. The Kenyan labour 
force is described by both investors and stakeholders as being skilled, with the 
necessary know-how and technological capacity necessary for production in the cut 
flower industry. Consequently, with regard to human capital, resource-seeking FDI in 
the Kenyan cut flower industry is mainly motivated by the access to skilled labour. 
Infrastructure 
Based on both the interview results and previous research on Kenya, it is possible to 
identify created assets in the Kenyan cut flower industry. One such created asset is 
infrastructure facilities, which is identified as an important motivation for resource-
seeking and competitiveness-enhancing FDI.  
Both the investors and stakeholders emphasise the importance of physical infrastructure 
as a determinant of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry. The quality of the end 
product when it reaches the consumer, is highly dependent on the efficiency and quality 
of the transportation network. The investors state that the infrastructure has improved 
over the last two decades, which has allowed the quality of the flowers to improve as 
well.  
According to previous research, KFC and the Kenyan government are continually 
working with improvements of the infrastructure, both to increase its efficiency and to 
meet international safety requirements. For instance, these efforts have enabled direct 
flight access to the major European markets (Njoroge & Okech 2011). 
Natural resources 
The interviews indicate that a broad range of natural resources are required to enable 
investment and production in the cut flower industry. One of the natural resources 
mentioned is the availability of land that is suitable for growing. The stakeholders argue 
that the availability of land poses a challenge for future FDI. For flower growers it is not 
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only the access land that is important; the land must also meet certain quality 
requirements. It must have access to water to ensure that the flowers produced are of 
high quality.  
The stakeholders explain that the government aims to raise the attraction of land in low 
potential areas, to meet the challenge of limited supply of land suitable for growing. 
Access to water raises the attraction of the land in low potential areas. Therefore, the 
government is building dams in these areas to increase the attraction of the land 
(Githiga 13/06/14). Access to a broad range of natural resources is categorized by 
previous research as a motivation for resource-seeking FDI, and as a created asset. 
Hence, FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry correspond to the motivation of both 
resource-seeking FDI and competitiveness-enhancing FDI.  
Competitiveness-enhancing 
The investors state that both the cut flower industry and the whole horticultural sector 
are well-developed in Kenya. Consequently, all necessary supplies and related services 
are easily accessible in Kenya. The size of the industry and well-developed internal 
infrastructure are considered to be advantages of investing in Kenya. In addition, the 
growers are densely located in clusters around the areas of Lake Naivasha and Mount 
Kenya (Ksoll 2009). In Naivasha, there is even a Flower Business Park for flower 
growers and breeders. In these areas the FDI benefits from agglomeration economies. 
As a result, it is possible to identify agglomeration economies as a created asset in the 
Kenyan cut flower industry. 
Efficiency-seeking 
One of the main reasons stated by the investors in explaining why many investors 
consider investing abroad is to lower the cost of production. Africa is considered to be 
low cost based, since the costs of production are generally lower than in many other 
parts of the world (Mwirigi 14/06/14). Some of the investors state that, as the costs of 
production increased in Europe at the end of the 1990’s, growers started to seek 
different ways and locations to grow flowers (Zuurbier 14/05/14, Kneppers 16/05/14).  
As an example of how the production costs are lowered, the investors mention labour 
costs. Some the investors state that labour is more expensive in Kenya, than in the 
neighbouring countries. Labour costs are considerably lower than in the countries of 
origin of the investors, which makes investments in Kenya advantageous. Thus, FDI in 
the Kenyan cut flower industry is efficiency-seeking in the sense that lowering of the 
costs of production is an important motivation to stay competitive on the global market.  
In terms of the investment climate, the stakeholders highlight that Kenya has a market 
open for investment, and that the Kenyan government is active in investment 
facilitation. According to previous research, the Kenyan government has implemented 
various policy strategies during the recent ten years, to support export industries
6
 and to 
promote and launch further private sector investments and FDI
7
 (UNCTAD 2012).With 
regards to the cut flower industry, these reforms resulted in the provision of investment 
incentives, such as reduced duties and taxes on imported inputs such as greenhouses and 
refrigeration equipment (Njoroge & Okech 2011).  
                                                             
6 Industrialization strategy 2020. For detailed presentation see Angatia (1996). 
7 Private sector development strategy of 2005. For detailed presentation see GoK (2006). 
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The statements of the stakeholders, together with the recent policy changes in Kenya, 
indicate that the FDI policy framework is a motivation of efficiency-seeking FDI in the 
cut flower industry. On the other hand, the presence of corruption hampers the 
investment climate. The investors argue that the corruption makes it harder for investors 
to set up business in Kenya. This provides the opposite indication, i.e. in the Kenyan cut 
flower industry the FDI policy framework is not a motivation of efficiency-seeking FDI.   
7.2. Analysis based on institutional theory  
This section provides an analysis of the results presented in section 6.2, on the basis of 
the institutional theory presented in chapter 3. The aim of this analysis is to examine 
how property rights protection in the Kenyan cut flower industry relates to the key 
features of the institutional theory. This is done by analysing the interviews on the basis 
of the three main features of the institutional theoretical framework: definition, security 
of property rights and the role of transaction costs. 
Defining property rights 
The institutional theoretical framework defines property rights to land by the level of 
access to the land. In consequence, property rights to land define the duration of the 
land contracts, the ability of the land contract to match the time period required by the 
investment, and the investors’ ability to protect the land. The implication of the 
definition of property rights is that it specifies the legitimate uses of the land, and the 
right to claim benefits or an income stream of the land. As a result, property rights 
define the costs and rewards of the decision to use land, and create incentive structures 
for investors (World Bank 2003:22, 25-27, Musole 2009). 
The level of access to agricultural land in Kenya is constrained by law. Foreigners are 
prohibited from owning land for agricultural purposes (UNCTAD 2012). Consequently, 
perpetual user rights are not possible. The investors are precluded from the exclusive 
right to the land, and its function as long-run collateral. The duration of the land 
contracts varies among the investors, but the maximum lease term possible is 99 years. 
The investors consider the maximum lease term to be sufficient, since it more than 
matches the required length for any investment. For the cut flower industry, the right to 
claim an income stream of the land is crucial, since the production of flowers is 
dependent on access to land. None of the investors have so far experienced any issues 
with their land contracts. Therefore, the right to claim the benefits of the land plots is 
not an issue among the sampled investors. 
Are property rights well-defined? 
The theoretical framework stipulates that property rights to land are well-defined, or 
secure, if the government recognizes and protects land titles and the access to the land. 
If the access, the duration of the access, or the boundaries of the land, are not clearly 
identifiable, the property rights to land are not well-defined (Biglaiser & Straat 2010, 
Resnick & Li 2003). 
The views of the investors and the stakeholders deviate, on the matter of the process 
towards the government recognizing and protecting land titles. The stakeholders argue 
that the legal side of both the land registration process and the land contracts provide the 
investor with a guarantee for the investment. Most of the investors highlight that the 
presence of corruption complicates the process. Thus, based on the theoretical 
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stipulation of secure property rights, it is not possible to argue that property rights are 
well-defined in Kenya.   
An additional point made by the investors is that to ensure the level of access to the 
land, the investor needs to set up a registered land contract with a reliable party. One of 
the investors also argues that the government corruption does not erode the legitimacy 
of the land contracts. Together, these views imply that once the land is legally registered 
and a contract is set up, the law actually provides a guarantee for the investment, and the 
property rights to land are well-defined.  
Although, the extent to which property rights to land are well-defined is not universally 
extended to all land plots. In the case of land disputes, it is clear that property rights are 
not well-defined. Land disputes imply that titles are not protected, since the disputes 
often correspond to a situation where several parties claim ownership of the same piece 
of land.  
Transaction costs 
The theoretical framework defines transaction costs as the costs of measuring the 
attributes of a valuable resource, as well as the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and 
enforcing contracts (North 1990:61-62, Musole 2009). The stakeholders argue that the 
government aims to provide the necessary information and guidance to the investors. 
Under these circumstances both market and non-market transaction costs should be 
minimized.  
However, there is a clear division in the views of the investors and the stakeholders on 
the access to information and provision of guidance. In terms of gathering information, 
the investors highlight the importance of previous experience and contacts. Hence, 
based on the statements of the investors, it is possible to identify market transaction 
costs, such as acquiring legal assistance to set-up, monitor and enforce the land contract. 
It is also possible to identify non-market transaction costs, by the importance of 
ensuring the land is not disputed. Further, it is possible to identify non-market 
transaction costs related to the compliance with rules and regulations. The rules and 
regulations are often described as complicated and difficult to follow. Further adding to 
the identified transaction costs, rent seeking government officials may also pressure the 
investors to pay bribes.  
The theoretical framework states that if the transaction costs are too high, no economic 
exchange occurs. In the case of land disputes, the costs of negotiating, monitoring and 
enforcing contracts are high, since land titles are not well-defined. Hence, the associated 
costs and risk are considered to be high. In correspondence with the theoretical 
framework, most of the investors state that they would not invest on disputed land.  
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8. Conclusions from Part II 
Based on the results of the interviews with investors and stakeholders, it is possible to 
identify a large number of important determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower 
industry. The determinants mentioned by both the investors and stakeholders are natural 
resources, market size, human capital, and infrastructure. In addition, the stakeholders 
highlight the importance of the investment climate. From the factors mentioned above, 
it is clear that there are numerous prerequisites enabling investment and production in 
the cut flower industry.  
Based on the findings of the analysis in chapter seven, FDI in the Kenyan cut flower 
industry corresponds to all the economic categories listed in Table 1, i.e. market-, 
resource-, efficiency-seeking, and competitiveness-enhancing. Consequently, when 
mapping the determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry according to Table 
1, it is evident that there is no single type of economic motivation driving FDI in the 
Kenyan cut flower industry. Rather, the analysis indicates that the different categories, 
and thus the identified determinants, overlap and interdependently motivate FDI. 
In light of the industry’s dependence on access to land, the examination of property 
rights as a determinant of FDI is operationalised by considering property rights to land. 
The results indicate that the investors consider property rights protection to be an 
important determinant of their investment. Foreigners are not allowed own land for 
agricultural purposes in Kenya. But the possibility to claim benefits, or an income 
stream, from the land is not an issue among the sampled investors. Based on the 
theoretical stipulation of secure property rights, it is not possible to conclude that 
property rights to land are well-defined in Kenya. However, once the land is legally 
registered and a land contract is set up, the law actually does provide a guarantee of the 
investment. 
The results indicate that land disputes are commonly occurring in Kenya, and it is clear 
that property rights are not secure in the case of land disputes. The risk of losing sunken 
assets and costs, e.g. greenhouses and other production facilities on the land, is 
increased in case of land disputes. Furthermore, the investors state that they would not 
invest on disputed land. Based on institutional theory, this implies that the transaction 
costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contacts are too high for an economic 
exchange to occur. 
With regard to transaction costs, it is possible to identify both market and non-market 
transaction costs. Market transaction costs consist of e.g. the cost of acquiring legal 
assistance to set-up, monitor and enforce the land contract. In addition, it is possible to 
identify non-market transaction costs, e.g. generated from ensuring that there are no 
disputes on the land by scanning the history of the land. In terms of complying with 
rules and regulations, rent seeking government officials and complicated rules and 
regulation, are also contribute to increasing the non-market transaction costs.  
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Part III: A Quantitative Study of the Determinants of FDI in a 
Developing Country 
Part III provides a description of and motivation for the data and variables, and a 
presentation of the regression model and results. The aim of this section is to 
quantitatively examine the determinants of FDI in 55 developing countries. The 
qualitative results provide evidence on the determinants of FDI in one developing 
country, based on the subjective opinions of a sample of decision makers. The 
quantitative study provides an opportunity to generalise these results. In addition, it 
allows for an investigation of the possible presence of reversed causality between FDI 
and property rights. 
9. Descriptive Statistics 
9.1. Data 
The dataset considered is an unbalanced panel, including data on developing countries 
over the time period 1980-2010. A list of the countries included is provided in 
Appendix 2. The countries included in the sample are low-income and middle-low-
income developing countries
8
. The low-income and middle-low-income countries that 
lack data on property rights protection are excluded from the sample. In total, the 
sample includes 55 developing countries.  
Data on property rights protection is gathered from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al 
2012a). The data consists of the index Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights. 
The index ranges from one to ten, with higher values implying better property rights 
protection. The index is available over the time period 1970-2012. Pre 2000 
observations are available on five year basis only, while the index after 2000 is 
available on an annual basis (Teorell et al 2013a, Gwartney et al 2012b). Due to the 
limited data availability, five-year averages are calculated for all the data used in the 
study. The calculation is shown in Appendix 3. 
The data on FDI (net inflows as percentage share of the host country’s GDP) is 
collected from The World Bank (World Bank 2014e). Net FDI inflow is the sum of the 
host country’s equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long and short term 
capital as shown in the balance of payments (Teorell et al 2013a). The data on the 
control variables GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, secondary school enrolment and 
inflation rate is available on a yearly basis. Five-year averages are calculated for these 
variables as well, according to the calculation shown in Appendix 3.  
The data on GDP per capita (constant, PPP adjusted based on 2005 prices), the GDP 
growth rate (annual percentage growth rate) and the rate of inflation (annual percentage 
change) is collected from the World Bank (World Bank 2014a, 2014b, 2014d). Data on 
trade openness (total trade as a percentage share of GDP) is collected from the Penn 
World Table (Heston et al 2012). Secondary school enrolment is collected from the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UNESCO 2012). Total secondary school enrolment is 
                                                             
8 In accordance with the World Bank (2014f) categorization. Low-income countries: with a GNI per 
capita that is 1,045 dollars or less. Middle-low-income: with a GNI per capita above 1,045 dollars but 
below or equal to 4,125 dollars. 
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defined as the number of students enrolled at the secondary level, measured as gross 
enrolment rate
9
 (Teorell et al 2013a). 
9.2. Variables 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is net FDI inflows. In previous research additional measures of 
FDI are used as well, such as total FDI stocks (see e.g. Gwenhamo 2011), or as 
percentage share of world FDI (see e.g. Resnick 2001). Net FDI inflow has the 
advantage of having relatively wide data coverage. Furthermore, it is a measure 
commonly used in previous research (see e.g. Biglaiser & Straat 2010, Jensen 2003, 
Biglaiser & DeRouen 2000). 
Explanatory variables  
The property rights variable is measured by the index Legal Structure and Security of 
Property Rights (Gwartney et al 2012b, Teorell et. al 2013a). The index provides insight 
into the host country adherence to rule of law, enforcement of property rights, and the 
efficiency of the court systems (Biglaiser & Straat 2010). In previous research, the 
effect of property rights on FDI is found to be positive (see e.g. Gwenhamo 2011, 
Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007, Mathur & Singh 2011, Resnick & Li 2003). Hence, previous 
research indicates that FDI is encouraged by better property rights protection. In this 
spirit, the effect of property rights variable is expected to be positive on FDI.  
The choice of control variables is based on the determinants commonly identified as 
important by previous research (see e.g. Mathur & Singh 2011, Biglaiser & Straat 2010, 
Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010, Gwenhamo 2011, Asiedu 2006, Knutsen et. al 2011, 
Morisset 2001, Resnick 2001, Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007, Resnick & Li 2003). Previous 
research considers a multiple of factors as possible determinants of FDI. But it is 
possible to identify some agreement among previous studies on some of the most 
fundamental determinants of FDI. The aim of the chosen control variables is to 
represent these fundamental determinants.  
In UNTAD (1998), the traditional economic determinants of FDI are categorized into 
three clusters, reflecting major motivations assumed to drive FDI: market-seeking, 
resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking (UNCTAC 1998). A brief summary of the key 
determinants of each category is shown in Table 1. Together with the findings of 
previous research, the main identified determinants of each cluster are combined to 
form a set of control variables.  
The main listed economic determinants assumed to motivate market-seeking FDI are 
the host country market size and growth rate. In previous research it is generally 
accepted that market size and growth are crucial determinants of FDI (see e.g. Mathur & 
Singh 2011, Biglaiser & Straat 2010, Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010, Resnick & Li 
2003). The market size and growth represent the firms need to remain competitive, by 
accessing large and growing markets (UNCTAD 1998, Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010, 
Morisset 2001). They are included in the regression model, and are represented by the 
                                                             
9 Gross enrolment rate is defined as the number of pupils enrolled at a given level of education, regardless 
of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same level of 
education (Teorell et al 2013a). 
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variables GDP per capita and the annual GDP growth rate, respectively. Both the GDP 
growth rate and GDP per capita are expected positively affect FDI. 
Yet, the size and growth of the domestic markets do not reflect the determinants of FDI 
aiming to serve global markets through export. Yet, access to global markets and 
openness to trade are important determinants of FDI (Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010, 
Resnick 2001). These factors are represented in the regression model by the variable 
openness to trade. Host countries that are well-linked and open to the global markets 
should attract more FDI. Accordingly, openness to trade is expected to have a positive 
effect on FDI. 
The determinants of resource-seeking FDI are focused on the costs and productivity of 
the factors of production, such as human capital (UNCTAD 1998). In previous research 
human capital is a commonly considered determinant (see e.g. Gwenhamo 2011, Asiedu 
2006, Knutsen et al 2011). The availability of cheap and skilled labour not only attracts 
FDI as a measure to cut costs and increase efficiency, but is thus also an important 
determinant of efficiency-seeking FDI (UNCTAD 1998, Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010). 
To capture the effect of human capital, the variable secondary school enrolment is 
included in the regression model. The effect of secondary school enrolment is expected 
to be positive on FDI.  
In addition, a policy variable is included in the regression model to reflect the 
macroeconomic stability of the host country. Policy variables represent factors that 
policy makers alter through their actions and decisions. Policy variables often aim to 
reflect the economic, political and social stability of the host country (Asiedu 2006, 
UNCTAD 1998). In previous research the host county inflation rate is commonly used 
as a measure of macroeconomic stability (see e.g. Asiedu 2006, Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 
2010). The inflation rate provides a signal of the health status of the host economy, and 
is thus expected to have a negative effect on FDI.  
The descriptive data of all the variables is shown in Appendix 4. The variables are 
tested for the presence of non-stationarity, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
results of the tests are presented in Appendix 5. 
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10. Quantitative Method 
To empirically test the effect of property rights on FDI, a regression model is estimated 
using OLS and TSLS. The following variables are used: net FDI inflow (%) (     ), 
property rights index (index value one to ten) (       ), logged GDP per capita (level at 
constant prices 2005) (       ), GDP growth rate (%) (       ), openness to trade (%) 
(      ), secondary school enrolment (%) (       ) and inflation rate (%) (      ). Using 
these variables the following regression model is estimated: 
                         , 
 
                                                     , 
                , (1) 
        , (2) 
 
where i indicates country i, and t time period t. The error term in (1) consists of a white 
noise component (   ) and two fixed effects components: a time independent cross-
section fixed effect (  ), and a period fixed effect (  ). The cross-section fixed effect 
allows the sampled countries to have individual intercepts in the data, while the period 
fixed effect allows for time dependent effects common to all the sampled countries. The 
error term in (2) only consists of a white noise component (   ), and is considered in the 
pooled versions of the OLS and TSLS estimations (Verbeek 2012:377, 380).  
The issue of reversed causality running from FDI to property rights is highlighted in 
some of the previous research (see e.g.  Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007, Ali et. al 2011, 
Anghel 2005, Hussain & Kimuli 2012). Reversed causality implies that it is not only 
property rights that affect FDI. The competition for FDI inflows among the host 
countries also contributes to improving property rights protection (Ali et al. 2011). For 
the regression model, the presence of reversed causality implies that the OLS estimation 
is biased and inconsistent. The problem is tackled by including an instrumental variable. 
It is always difficult to find relevant and valid instruments. A valid instrument is 
correlated with the endogenous variable of the model, but not with the model’s error 
term. Furthermore, the instrument should not have a direct effect on the explained 
variable (Ali et. al 2011, Verbeek 2012:137,149).  
The choice of instrument is based on the findings of previous research. However, the 
use of country fixed effects in a panel data regression rules out the use of some 
commonly considered time-invariant instruments
10
 (see e.g. Ali et. al 2011, La Porta et 
al. 1999, Levine 2005). In previous research this issue is handled by including internal 
instruments (Bénassy-Quéré 2007). In this spirit, a five year lagged value of the 
property rights variable is included as an instrument in the regression model. The key 
motivation for using the lagged property rights variable as an instrument is that current 
FDI inflows are unlikely to be determined by future values of property rights protection 
(see e.g. Verbeek 2012:376). 
Commonly considered time-invariant instruments are settler mortality and variables 
representing religious, ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation (see e.g. Ali et. al 2011, La 
Porta et al. 1999, Levine 2005). To enable the inclusion of these instruments, and thus 
                                                             
10 Fixed effects remove any time invariant components, i.e. constants in the data are removed. For a 
detailed presentation on fixed effects see e.g. Verbeek (2012) pages 377-381. 
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both extend the analysis to benefit from additional information, and to test the 
robustness of the results, a different method of estimation needs to be considered. 
Therefore, pooled versions of the regression model are considered. A pooled regression 
treats all observations, of all time periods, as a single sample. Hence, in a pooled 
regression the variables are assumed to be comprehensive enough to capture all relevant 
characteristics of the individual countries, and thus there are assumed to be no 
unobserved effects in the model (Dougherty 2011:518). The application of this 
assumption needs to be taken into account in analysing the results.       
Settler mortality consists of the logged mortality rate faced by European settlers at the 
time of colonisation (Teorell et. al 2013b:45). The motivation for using settler mortality 
as an instrument for property rights is based on the idea that the colonisers brought with 
them, and created, institutions to define and enforce property rights. The colonisers did 
not settle in areas where disease and mortality rates were high. Accordingly, the settler 
mortality rate is assumed to be negatively correlated with FDI (Ali et. al 2011, Levine 
2005). Data on settler mortality rate is collected from Acemoglu et al (2001).  
The fractionalisation variables reflect the probability that two randomly selected people 
do not share a characteristic. The characteristics considered in each variable are religion, 
ethnicity, and language. The higher the value of the variable, the less is the probability 
that two people in a population share that characteristic (Teorell et. al 2013b). The key 
motivation for using fractionalisation variables as instruments for property rights is that 
high fractionalisation among people, imply higher social and political tension. Tension 
among people is believed to hamper the development of the institutional environment, 
resulting in poorer property rights protection (Ali et. al 2011).  Data on the three 
variables is collected from Alesina et al (2003). 
The validity of the instruments is examined by first testing if each of the instruments has 
a significant effect on the property rights variable. This is done by regressing each of the 
instruments together with the control variables on property rights. The instruments that 
show a significant effect on property rights are settler mortality, linguistic 
fractionalisation and the lagged property rights variable. Next, each of these three 
instruments is tested against the dependent variable, i.e. net FDI inflows. This is done 
by regressing each of the instruments together with the property rights variable and the 
control variables on FDI. The instruments show no direct effect on the dependent 
variable, since none of the three instruments have a significant effect on FDI. 
The same testing procedure is conducted for the lagged property rights variable only, 
but with fixed effects included in the panel data estimation. Finally, a Sargan’s test of 
over-identifying restrictions confirms the mutual validity of the instruments in the 
pooled estimation. Detailed testing procedure and results are shown in Appendix 6.   
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Table 4 
 
    
 Variable OLSⁱ TSLSⁱ OLSⁱⁱ TSLSⁱⁱ 
Constant -8.90** -8.86**   
 
(3.63) (4.20)   
GDP per capita 0.85* 0.78 -0.54*** -0.59*** 
 
(0.48) (0.56) (0.06) (0.09) 
     0.07** 0.11*** 0.06 0.08** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Openness 0.02** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary school 
enrolment 
0.02 0.24 0.34*** 0.35*** 
 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.13) (0.08) 
Inflation rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Property Rights 0.71* 0.26 0.52 0.77*** 
 
(0.39) (0.44) (0.31) (0.26) 
           0.62 0.64 0.31 0.35 
Number of obs. 239 199 239 127 
***Significant at 0.1% level, **Significant at 5% level, *Significant at 10% level 
Standard errors shown in brackets 
ⁱ Estimated using fixed effects. 
ⁱⁱ Pooled regression. White’s cross-section standard errors.   
 
11. Regression Analysis 
The regression results are shown in Table 4. The second column presents the results of 
the regression model estimated using a fixed effects OLS estimation, and the third 
column using fixed effects TSLS. The fourth column shows the results using a pooled 
OLS estimation, and the fifth column using pooled TSLS. The estimation results using 
TSLS address the potential problem of reversed causality by including instrumental 
variables, i.e. the lagged property rights variable in the fixed effects estimation and 
settler mortality, linguistic fractionalisation and the lagged property rights variable in 
the pooled estimation.  
The estimated coefficients, obtained using a fixed effects OLS estimation, are shown in 
the second column of Table 4. The coefficients have the expected signs, indicating that 
the effect of GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, trade openness, secondary school 
enrolment and property rights on FDI is positive. The estimated effect of the inflation 
rate is very small, which is not in line with the expected negative effect. However, the 
estimated coefficient is not significant. The effects of GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
openness to trade and property rights are found to be significantly positive. 
Accordingly, the result provides a strong indication of the importance of market size, 
openness to trade and property rights protection as determinants of FDI. The size of the 
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estimated coefficient of property rights (0.71) indicates that the effect of a 1% increase 
in protection of property rights has a 0.71% effect on FDI.  
The results of the pooled OLS estimation shown in the fourth column are largely in line 
with the results of the fixed effects OLS estimation. The effects of GDP growth rate, 
secondary schooling, openness to trade and property rights on FDI are positive, and in 
line with the expected result. The estimated effect of the inflation rate is small in the 
pooled OLS estimation as well. However, the estimated effect of GDP per capita on 
FDI is significantly negative, and not in line with the expected results. This result may 
be explained by the fact that the pooled estimation does not take individual country 
effects into consideration, and thus does not allow for individual intercepts in the data.  
The third column shows the estimation results using fixed effects TSLS. The results are 
mainly consistent with those provided by the OLS estimations, shown in the second and 
fourth columns. The effects of GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, openness to trade, 
secondary school enrolment and property rights on FDI are positive, but now only 
significantly positive for the GDP growth rate and openness to trade. In terms of the 
size of the estimated effects, both the effects of GDP per capita and property rights on 
FDI are found to be smaller using the fixed effects TSLS, compared to the results 
obtained when using fixed effects OLS. However, the estimated coefficients are non-
significant. The inflation rate has a non-significant and small estimated effect in this 
estimation as well. The estimated effect of openness to trade is of the same size as in the 
fixed effects OLS estimation, while the estimated effect of the GDP growth rate is 
slightly stronger. 
The fifth column shows the results of the pooled TSLS estimation. The results are 
generally in line with those in column two to four. The estimated effects of the GDP 
growth rate, secondary school enrolment, openness to trade and property rights are all 
significantly positive. However, in line with the estimation result of the pooled OLS 
shown in the fourth column, the estimated effect of GDP per capita is significantly 
negative. Again, this may be explained by the existence of unobserved country 
individual effects. The size of the estimated coefficient of property rights (0.77) 
indicates that the effect of a 1% increase in protection of property rights has a 0.77% 
effect on FDI. 
The overall consistency of the results using the different estimation techniques implies 
robustness of the results. The consistency of the results using OLS and TSLS indicates 
that reversed causality does not affect the results. A possible explanation is that 
institutions are sticky. The theoretical framework defines property rights, as an 
institution, consisting of social agreements backed by both informal and formal norms. 
Changing norms, both formal and informal, do take a considerable amount of time. 
Formal norms are set by the government, and may be more impressionable to increased 
FDI, and creating improved institutional environment and thus the property rights 
protection. Nevertheless, informal norms rely on consensus among people and evolve 
through human interaction. As a result, this component of the property rights might not 
be as impressionable, or sensitive, to increased FDI. 
Overall, the results are largely in line with both previous research and the theoretical 
framework. Previous research often finds that the effect of the market size is positive on 
FDI (see e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007, Mathur & Singh 2011, Biglaiser & Straat 2010, 
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Gwenhamo 2011, Resnick 2001, Resnick & Li 2003, Asiedu 2006, Knutsen et al 2011, 
Morisset 2001, Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010). The effect of openness to trade on FDI is 
also often found to be positive (see e.g. Mathur & Singh 2011, Biglaiser & Straat 2010, 
Gwenhamo 2011, Resnick 2001, Tejinder & Newhouse 1995, Morisett 2001). In a 
similar vein, the effect of human capital on FDI is often found to be positive (see e.g. 
Mathur & Singh 2011, Gwenhamo 2011, Asiedu 2006, Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010, 
Knutsen et al 2011). However, the regression results show that the effect of the inflation 
rate on FDI is close to zero. Hence, the effect of the inflation rate indicates that 
macroeconomic instability affects FDI to a very small extent. This is neither in line with 
the expected result, nor with previous research. However, the estimates are not 
significant. In previous research the effect of the inflation rate on FDI is found to be 
small but negative (see e.g. Mottaleba & Kalirajanb 2010, Asiedu 2006).  
The positive effect of property rights on FDI is in line with both the theoretical 
framework and previous research (see e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al 2007, Mathur & Singh 
2011, Gwenhamo 2011, Resnick & Li 2003). The theoretical framework suggests that 
an increase in property rights protection results in increased FDI, through a lowering of 
transaction costs and risks. Even though the regression analysis does not explicitly 
examine the transaction costs and risk reduction, it does confirm the link of improved 
property rights protection leading to increased net FDI inflows.   
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12. Conclusions from Part III 
In answering what determines FDI in developing countries, the results show that the 
effects of market size, human capital, openness to trade and property rights on FDI is 
positive. The effect of property rights as a determinant of FDI in developing countries is 
thus found to be significantly positive. Overall, the results are in line with both previous 
research and the theoretical framework. The consistency of the results using the 
different estimation techniques implies robustness of the results. 
The fixed effects estimations using OLS and TSLS are largely consistent. The effects of 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, openness to trade, secondary school enrolment and 
property rights is positive on FDI. The estimated positive effect of property rights on 
FDI is large and significant using OLS. The estimated effect of the inflation rate on FDI 
is found to be insignificant and close to zero using both of the estimations techniques.  
The pooled estimations using OLS and TSLS confirm most of the results obtained from 
the fixed effects estimations. The effect of GDP growth, openness to trade, secondary 
school enrolment and property rights is positive on FDI. The estimated effect of the 
inflation rate is again close to zero. The estimated positive effect of property rights on 
FDI is large and significant using TSLS. The deviation in the results using pooled OLS 
and TSLS, is that the effect of GDP per capita is found to be significantly negative. This 
may be explained by the existence of unobserved country fixed effects. 
An instrumental variable approach is used to handle the possible issue of reversed 
causality. It is always challenging to find relevant and valid instruments. The choice of 
instrument in this study is based on the findings of previous research. In the fixed 
effects estimation an internal instrument is included, i.e. the property rights variable 
lagged one period. The fixed effects estimation has the advantage of accounting for 
country and period fixed effects. But as a result, all time-invariant components in the 
data are removed.  
In order to benefit from the time-invariant instruments commonly used in previous 
research, an alternative estimation is used. Hence, a pooled TSLS is used, where no 
country or period fixed effects are included in the error term. The instruments 
considered in the pooled regression are settler mortality, linguistic fractionalisation and 
the lagged property rights variable.  
The estimations, using either a fixed effects or a pooled TSLS, indicate that reversed 
causality does not affect the results. A possible explanation is that it takes time for 
institutions to be changed. Thus, the link between FDI and property rights is found to 
not be subject to reversed causality. 
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13. Conclusion 
This study has its starting point in the fact that not all developing countries are equally 
successful in attracting FDI. Consequently, this study aims to examine: what are the key 
determinants of FDI in a developing country? In previous research, there has been a 
recent shift of focus to the institutional environment of the host countries as a 
determinant of FDI. In line with this development, this study further aims to examine: 
what is the importance of property rights as a determinant of FDI? 
To meet this objective, a study is conducted both qualitatively and a quantitatively. The 
qualitative study examines the determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry, 
and is performed through interviews with investors and stakeholders in the industry. In 
its essence, the qualitative study provides evidence on the determinants of FDI in one 
developing country, based on subjective opinions of decision makers in the Kenyan cut 
flower industry. 
In order to draw general conclusions on the determinants of FDI in a developing 
country, it is important to put the qualitative results in relation to findings from other 
countries and industries. In this sense, a quantitative study is performed to examine the 
determinants of FDI across industries, developing countries and time. This is done by 
performing a regression analysis on 55 developing countries, over the time period 1980-
2010. The quantitative study provides a benchmark for testing the validity and 
universality of the qualitative results, and allows for an investigation of reversed 
causality between FDI and property rights.   
The results of the qualitative study indicate that natural resources, market size, human 
capital, infrastructure, investment climate and property rights are important 
determinants of FDI in the Kenyan cut flower industry. In light of the industry’s 
dependence on access to land, the examination of property rights as a determinant of 
FDI is operationalised by considering property rights to land. The results and the 
analysis of the results indicate that property rights to land provide an important 
guarantee of investments, and reduce transaction costs and risks related to the 
investments. However, the results also highlight that the extent of protection of property 
rights to land, is not universally extended to all plots of land.  
The qualitative results indicate that land disputes are common in Kenya. Land titles, and 
thus property rights to land, are not easily identifiable in the case of land disputes. The 
disputes often involve multiple claimants of ownership to the same plot of land. In these 
cases, the results indicate that foreign investors are discouraged from investment. In 
accordance with institutional theory, this is interpreted as property rights protection 
being inefficient, and transaction costs too high for an economic exchange to occur. 
Accordingly, an important contribution of the qualitative study is that it provides 
insights into the intermediate steps in the process of well-defined property rights leading 
to increased FDI, i.e. by lowering transaction costs and risks.  
The results of the quantitative study confirm that the effects of market size, human 
capital, openness to trade and property rights on FDI are positive. The results are 
fundamentally in line with the theoretical framework, and the findings of previous 
research. The results are consistent regardless of the estimation technique, indicating the 
robustness of the results.  
39 
 
The possible issue of reversed causality is highlighted in some of the previous research. 
Reversed causality implies that it is not only property rights that affect FDI. Increased 
FDI also contributes to the institutional development of improved property rights. 
Investigating this issue is of considerable importance, since the presence of reversed 
causality implies that the results of an OLS estimation are biased and inconsistent. In 
this spirit, this study contributes to the existing literature by means of two different sets 
of instruments. The results of the TSLS estimations suggest that reversed causality does 
not affect the results. Based on institutional theory, a possible explanation is that 
institutions are sticky, and are thus not affected by increased FDI.  
Mapping the determinants of FDI according to the categorisations of previous research 
as shown in Table 1, it is evident that there is no single type of motivation driving FDI. 
Both the qualitative and quantitative studies find that FDI is market-, resource-, and 
efficiency-seeking, and motived by the institutional environment. In addition, the 
quantitative study considers the importance of FDI policy, in terms of macroeconomic 
stability and openness to trade. The results of the qualitative study indicate that FDI is 
competitiveness-enhancing, and motivated by various created assets. From these results 
it is evident that there is no single economic or institutional motivation driving FDI in 
developing countries. Rather, the results of both studies indicate that the different 
categories, and thus the identified determinants, overlap and interdependently affect 
FDI.  
The determinants of FDI identified in the Kenyan cut flower industry correspond 
reasonably well to the variables considered in the quantitative study. However, the 
results of the qualitative and quantitative studies seem to highlight different aspects of 
the same determinants. For instance, the results found for the Kenyan cut flower 
industry emphasise size and access to international market, as important aspects of the 
market size. Conversely, the quantitative results consider the domestic market size and 
growth as important aspects of the market size. The same result seems to holds for 
human capital. The results for the Kenyan cut flower industry highlight industry know-
how, while the quantitative study considers the positive impact of secondary education. 
These two aspects are quite different, but are both important indicators of human 
capital. In conclusion, these results indicate the complex nature of examining the 
determinants of FDI.  
In other words, it is not only the case that there are several important determinants of 
FDI, but also that each of these determinants has a multiple of important features. 
Adding to the complexity of the subject, some of these features are difficult to measure 
and quantify. In terms of created assets, the qualitative results highlight agglomeration 
economies as a determinant of FDI. Agglomeration economies, along with some of the 
other important features of created assets, are indeed hard to measure and quantify. In 
this sense, qualitative studies provide important contributions to the subject. This study 
contributes to the existing literature by uncovering some of the important determinants 
that are hard to quantitatively examine. However, the results are by no means 
exhaustive, and hopefully this study will serve to inspire further research and qualitative 
studies on the subject.     
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Interview Guide - Main Questions and Discussion Points 
Which aspects do you consider as important determinants of FDI in the flower industry in Kenya? 
- Advantages of Kenya 
- Specific locational advantages 
 
Do you consider the system for property rights protection as an important determinant for FDI in the 
cut flower industry in Kenya?  
- Identification and protection of land plot boundaries 
- Duration of land contract 
- Perceived security of land contract  
- Enforcement mechanisms 
- System of settling possible disputes  
  
 Did you find it hard to gain access to the relevant information needed for your investment? 
- Assistance or guidance in Kenya 
- Time spent gathering information 
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Appendix 2: List of Countries 
 
Appendix 3: Calculation of Averages 
 
 
 
  
Countries  
Armenia Malawi 
Bangladesh Mali 
Benin Mauritania 
Bolivia Moldova 
Burkina Faso Mongolia 
Burundi Morocco 
Cambodia Mozambique 
Cameroon Nepal 
Central African Republic Nicaragua 
Chad Niger 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Nigeria 
Congo, Republic of Pakistan 
Cote d`Ivoire Papua New Guinea 
Egypt Paraguay 
El Salvador Philippines 
Ethiopia Rwanda 
Georgia Senegal 
Ghana Sierra Leone 
Guatemala Sri Lanka 
Guinea-Bissau Syrian Arab Republic 
Guyana Tanzania 
Haiti Togo 
Honduras Uganda 
India Ukraine 
Indonesia Vietnam 
Kenya Zambia 
Kyrgyzstan Zimbabwe 
Madagascar  
Year Averaged over period: 
1980 1978 – 1982 
1985 1983 – 1987 
1990 1988 – 1992 
1995 1993 – 1997 
2000 1998 – 2002 
2005 2003 – 2007 
2010 2008 – 2012 
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Appendix 4: Descriptive Data 
 
FDI 
flows 
Ln GDP 
per 
capita 
      Openness 
Secondary 
school 
enrolment 
Inflation 
rate 
Property 
Rights 
Mean -0.20 7.31 3.14 59.46 3.34 81.97 1.36 
Median 0.07 7.28 3.65 54.00 3.49 8.98 1.43 
Maximum 3.15 8.80 15.01 156.51 4.61 5944.34 1.91 
Minimum -7.84 5.59 -44.90 9.04 0.83 -6.45 0.51 
Std. Dev. 1.73 0.68 4.64 28.94 0.84 533.81 0.30 
Obs. 357 359 365 371 318 352 316 
 
Appendix 5: Econometric Tests 
Tests     
Breusch-Pagan Test for 
heteroskedasticity 
OLSⁱ TSLSⁱ OLSⁱⁱ TSLSⁱⁱ 
  : homoskedastic errors Cannot 
reject 
Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject 
Reject if: F-stat>F-critical 1.81<1.98 0.03<1.98 1.80<1.98 0.74<2.03 
 
Df  (F-distribution) 
230, 8 
(200, 8) 
190, 8 
(200, 8) 
230, 8 
(200, 8) 
127,8 
(100,3) 
Breusch-Godfrey Test for 
Autocorrelation 
    
  : No autocorrelation Cannot 
reject 
Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject 
Reject if: LM > Critical value 13.11<15.51 11.55<15.51 12.85<15.51 11.18<15.51 
 
Df (Chi-squared) 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
ⁱ Fixed effects panel data regression 
ⁱⁱ Pooled regression. White’s cross-section standard errors. 
Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test 
for non-
stationarity 
Ln GDP 
per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
rate (%) 
Openness 
(%) 
School 
enrolmen
t (%) 
FDI net 
inflows 
(%) 
Inflati
on 
(%) 
Property 
rights 
  : non-stationary 
Reject if p<0.05 
Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
 
(trend & 
intercept) 
Statistic 
Probability 
 
144.79 
0.02 
 
848.46  
0.00 
 
149.99 
0.01 
 
306.56  
0.00 
 
1390.52 
0.00 
 
911.6
20.00 
 
149.59 
0.01 
(intercept) 
Statistic 
Probability 
  
870.08 
0.00 
   
1365.39 
0.00 
 
722.2
8 0.00 
 
171.37 
0.00 
Sargan’s test for 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
       
  : over-identifying 
restrictions are valid 
Reject if: p<0.05 
Cannot reject 
 
 
11.98 
0.21 
     
Sargan statistic 
Probability 
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Appendix 6:Testing the Instruments 
***significant at 0.1% level **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level 
Standard errors shown in brackets 
ⁱ Pooled regression. White’s cross-section standard errors.  
ⁱⁱ Fixed effects panel data regression.  
             
 
(1) OLSⁱ (2) First stageⁱ 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Property rights 
(3) Instrument testingⁱ 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
 FDI 
(4) 
Second 
stageⁱ 
(5) 
OLSⁱⁱ 
(6) First 
stageⁱⁱ 
(7) 
Instrument 
testingⁱⁱ 
(8) 
Second 
stageⁱⁱ 
Variable 
Dependent 
variable: 
FDI 
Depende
nt 
variable: 
FDI 
Depende
nt 
variable
: 
FDI 
Dependent 
variable: 
Property 
rights 
Dependent 
variable: 
FDI 
Dependen
t variable: 
FDI 
Constant         -8.90** -2.07*** -8.06* -8.86** 
         (3.63) (0.74) (4.23) (4.20) 
GDP per capita -0.54*** 0.36*** 0.13*** 0.19*** -0.53*** -0.46*** -0.47*** -0.59*** 0.85* 0.39*** 0.62 0.78 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.48) (0.09) (0.57) (0.56) 
      0.06 0.01 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.11** 0.05 0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.01 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Openness 0.03*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.00 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sec. school enrol 0.34*** -0.07 0.01 -0.06* 0.41*** 0.30*** 0.31** 0.35*** 0.02 -0.02 0.24 0.24 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.18) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.35) (0.06) (0.36) (0.36) 
Inflation rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Property Rights 0.52    0.11 0.26 0.15 0.77*** 0.71*  0.02 0.26 
 (0.31)    (0.44) (0.28) (0.21) (0.26) (0.39)  (0.47) (0.44) 
Prop. Rights (-5)  0.31***   0.10     0.35*** 0.61  
  (0.11)   (0.39)     (0.07) (0.44)  
Settler Mortality   0.05***   0.03       
   (0.02)   (0.04)       
Linguistic fract.    0,14**   0.31      
    (0.06)   (0.25)      
Number of obs. 239 200 156 228 199 155 236 127 239 200 199 199 
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Equations corresponding to the tests conducted in Appendix 6 
 
In all equations listed below:   
                                                     , 
 
Pooled estimations: 
                                      
 
(1) OLS:                             
(2) First Stage:                             
(3) Instrument testing:                                    
(4) Second stage:                          
 
Fixed effects estimations: 
                 
 
(5) OLS:                                     
(6) First stage:                                    
(7) Instrument testing:                                          
(8) Second stage:                                
 
 
